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Chapter summary 
The promotion of electricity generated from Renewable Energy Sources (RES) has 
recently gained high priority in the energy policy strategies of many countries in response to 
concerns about global climate change, energy security and other reasons. This chapter 
compares and contrasts the experience of a number of countries in Europe, states in the US as 
well as Japan in promoting RES, identifying what appear to be the most successful policy 
measures.   
1. Introduction 
The current high standard of living enjoyed in industrialized countries owes much to the 
high per capita consumption of energy, an increasing portion of which from electricity. Yet, 
many experts believe that the current patterns of generating electricity, mainly from fossil and 
nuclear resources, are not sustainable in the long term. Moreover, as Ford explains in an 
accompanying chapter in the same volume, there are increasing concerns about the 
environmental costs associated with electricity generation, notably greenhouse gas emissions. 
For these and other reasons, some experts are convinced that we must find a way to gradually 
convert into a more sustainable energy conversion and use over time. Such a conversion is not 
easy for many energy-intensive applications such as the air transportation, but is relatively 
less painful in case of electricity generation.  
A number of studies have concluded that with efficient use of energy, even a high 
standard of living can be sustained with renewable energy resources alone (e.g., Scheer, 2001, 
Flavin & Lenssen, 1994). While this may be an extreme case, many are convinced that we can 
– and should – rely on RES for an increasing portion of our energy needs. In a 2005 study, the 
European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), for example, concluded as much as 40% of 
our energy needs could be supplied from RES by 2040. 
Theoretically at least, there is plenty of RES to go around. The amount of solar radiation 
falling on earth every day exceeds the energy we consume world-wide in a year. The problem, 
of course, is that it is widely dispersed and intermittent. But with human ingenuity and 
improved technology, more RES can be captured and put to use. Historically, the largest 
contributor has been hydro resources and biomass. Technically speaking, the resource with 
the largest additional future potential1  for generating electricity from RES is wind energy, 
followed by photovoltaics (PV), solid biomass, hydro power and biogas. Other options with 
vast potential include tidal and wave power as well as solar thermal electricity.  
The appeal of renewables continues to grow (e.g., Meyer 2003) due to:  
• Their contribution in reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with current 
electricity generation; 
• Reduced dependence on imported energy resulting in energy security and a more 
diversified resource base; 
• Contribution to increases in local employment and income; and 
                                                 
1
 There are a variety of definitions of the renewable energy potential, e.g., Voogt et al.(2001) specifies as 
follows: "theoretical potential"  > "technical potential " > "realistic potential " > "realisable potential." Note the 
technical potential is substantially larger than the realizable potential that takes into account current non-
technological factors. 
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• Working as a hedge against volatile fossil fuel prices, as well as avoiding risks of 
disruption in fossil fuel supplies. 
Despite these advantages, renewables face a number of barriers if they are to contribute to 
the market on a large scale (e.g., Komor, 2003). The major barrier is the current cost 
disadvantage compared to electricity generated from fossil or nuclear fuels2. A significant 
switch to a renewable energy system would initially require substantial investments in 
infrastructure and will require technical innovations. Yet, such a future is, at least in principle, 
not far fetched because the costs of RES have been steadily declining and are likely to fall 
even faster as a result of learning-by-doing, the economies-of-scale and expected 
technological progress. Moreover, one convincing argument for supporting RES is that other 
energy technologies have traditionally received – and continue to receive – enormous 
subsidies from governments (e.g., Osterhuis, 2001). 
Aside from technological and investment obstacles, there are institutional, political and 
legislative barriers as well as problems arising from lack of sufficient grid capacity and public 
and political awareness in many countries. Additional barriers include lack of adequate 
recognition and support in regulations3, which limits RES’s contribution.  
To overcome these barriers, many governments have set ambitious targets and goals to 
promote electricity generation from RES in recent years. The European Union (EU), for 
example, issued a directive in 2001 with the target to increase the share of electricity from 
RES from 12 % in 1997 to 21 % by 2010 (EC, 2001). A more recent decision sets an even 
more ambitous 20% RES target for total energy by 2020.  
Currently, a number of schemes are being implemented in different countries to increase 
the share of renewables in the energy mix. While the specifics vary, most schemes are 
attempting to: 
• Enhance social acceptance and increase public awareness of renewable energy; 
• Improve reliability, technical performance and standardisation; 
• Remove obstacles to grid-connection; 
• Reduce administration and transaction costs while and minimizing the financial 
subsidies; and 
• Ensure sustainable growth of the renewable energy industry. 
The major promotional strategies include have investment subsidies, feed-in tariffs (FIT), 
tax incentives, portfolio standards, quota-based tradable green certificates (TGC) and 
tendering systems. While each scheme has certain advantages, there is no consensus on what 
may deliver the best results at the lowest cost. This is a crucial issue, especially if we are 
going to rely on renewables for a growing percentage of energy mix in the future.  
This chapter examines the experience gained from various regulatory and support 
strategies for the promotion of electricity generation from renewables. A secondary objective 
is to provide evidence to improve future policies. The chapter’s primary focus is on countries 
with considerable experience including the EU, the U.S., and Japan.  
                                                 
2
 This cost barrier is partly due to the lack of a level playing field as long as externalities from fossil fuels and 
nuclear are far from being included in the consumer price. 
3
 See also chapter on Distributed Generation  where the implications of absorbing large amounts of RES in the 
network are discussed 
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 covers historical development and the 
future potential of renewables. Section 3 classifies different types of promotional strategies 
and summarizes the experience to date. Section 4 evaluates the most important promotional 
programmes in different countries, and section 5 discusses the relative merits of different 
strategies. The chapter’s main conclusions appear at the end. 
2. Historical overview 
For millennia until the advent of industrial evolution, humans relied on renewable energy 
for most of their needs, albeit at a mere fraction of what we typically use today. Over the past 
two centuries, humankind has increasingly relied on fossil fuels, which are blamed for global 
climate change. 
Figure 1 shows the recent pattern of electricity generation from renewables for EU-25, 
US and Japan for the period 1990 to 2004, where EU has managed a gradually increasing 
trend compared to the US and in Japan. The side bar in Figure 1 shows the mix of renewables 
with the dominance of hydro electric generation everywhere4.  
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Figure 1 Recent pattern of electricity generation from RES in EU-25, U.S. and Japan (left) and 
breakdown of electricity generation from RES in 2004 (right)  
 Sources: EUROSTAT 2006, IEA 2006b, METI 2007; Black & Veatch 2006 
An entirely new picture emerges if hydro power is excluded (Figure 2). While in the early 
1990s the US had the highest non-hydro renewable generation, the EU has assumed this role 
since 2002, mostly due to a rapid growth of wind energy. The development in Japan can be 
characterised by modest growth in the waste-to-energy and geothermal power in 1990s and in 
PV and wind power in 2000s, with biomass resources such as black-liquor utilised in the pulp 
and paper industry playing an important role over the decades.  
                                                 
4
 Annual fluctuations in meteorological conditions explain the year-to-year fluctuations. 
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Figure 2 Historical pattern of electricity from non-hydro RES in EU-25, US and Japan 
(left) and breakdown of the mix for 2004 (right) 
 Sources: EUROSTAT 2006, IEA 2006b, METI 2007, Black & Veatch 2006 
Despite the recent gains in Europe, the recent pattern of growth of electricity generation 
from renewables is far from a success story. Between 1997 and 2004, for example, no country 
or region has been able to significantly increase the share of renewables as a percentage of 
total electricity consumed as illustrated in Figure 3. In the EU, the gain is a modest 2% from 
12% to 14%, Japan shows a slight decrease while there has been a significant drop in the US, 
from about 14% to 9%.  
Within the EU, only a few countries such as Denmark, Finland, Hungary and Germany 
have managed to increase their renewable shares considerably during the period and may be 
considered to be on target to meet these indicative targets as set in Directive 2001/77/EC5. For 
the EU as a whole, the 2006 actual is far from the target set for 2010. For the US, no specific 
targets currently exist on the national level6. Elsewhere, renewables continue to grow in 
absolute terms, but the story is pretty much the same: as a percentage of total electricity 
generation, renewables have a hard time keeping their current penetration levels. 
 
 
                                                 
5
  In addition to these sector-specific targets, a 20% target on primary energy  for all sectors except transport by 
2020 was introduced in early 2007. Yet, no specific targets for electricity have been specified which is a 
weakness of the new strategy.  
6
 However, in the US, a number of states have set targets and currently there is a proposal for a 15% mandate by 
2020. 
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Figure 3  Share of RES incl. large hydro in gross electricity consumption in EU-25, US 
and Japan. For the EU-25, 2010-targets are shown  
 Source: Ragwitz et al 2007, IEA 2006b 
 7 
3. Promotional strategies  
With the exception of hydro, some biomass and wind energy plants at favourable 
locations, most renewable energy technologies currently are at a cost disadvantage relative to 
conventional technologies. As already mentioned, part of this cost disadvantage is due to the 
fact that most conventional technologies have traditionally received – and continue to do so – 
significant direct and indirect subsidies including those offered to nuclear energy and oil and 
gas exploration. Moreover, until recently, the full effect of the externalities, notably emissions 
of greenhouse gases, have not been reflected in prices.  
Renewable energy advocates argue that RES deserve similar subsidies to overcome their 
current cost-disadvantage, pointing out that over time, these subsidies can be reduced or 
eliminated. Such arguments aside, the pace of development of electricity generation from 
RES is closely linked to the level of financial incentives and/or regulatory mandates, both of 
which are dependent on political decisions. And these are the main variables that differentiate 
the development pace and penetration of RES in different countries. This section examines a 
number of schemes for supporting renewables and compares the results. 
 
Table 1. Promotional strategies for supporting RES (Menanteau et al 2004, Haas et al 2004) 
  Direct Indirect 
  Price-driven Quantity-driven  
• Investment subsidies 
Investment 
focused • Tax credits 
• Low interest/Soft loans 
• Tendering system for 
investment grant 
Regulatory 
Generation based 
• (Fixed) Feed-in tariffs 
• Fixed Premium system
• Tendering system for  
long term contracts 
• Tradable Green 
Certificate system 
• Environmental taxes 
• Simplification of authorisation 
procedures 
• Connection charges, 
balancing costs  
• Shareholder Programs Investment 
focused • Contribution Programs Voluntary 
Generation based • Green tariffs 
 
• Voluntary agreements 
 
Table 1 provides a classification of promotion strategies (Menanteau et al 2004, Haas et al 
2004). Fundamentally, there are four basic ways to subsidize or promote RES: 
 
Regulatory price-driven strategies 
Under these schemes no quantity goals or targets are established. Instead, the focus is on 
providing generators with financial support in terms of a subsidy per kW of capacity installed 
or a payment per kWh of energy produced. There are a number of variations under this 
scheme such as: 
 
• Investment focused strategies where financial support is provided through investment 
subsidies, soft loans or tax credits, usually per unit of generating capacity installed; 
• Generation based strategies where financial support is offered as a fixed payment or as a 
premium per unit of energy generated.  
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Under a fixed payment scheme such as feed-in-tariffs (FITs), generators receive a fixed 
amount per kWh generated regardless of the costs of generation or price while under a 
premium scheme a fixed amount is added to the electricity price. In practice, this makes a big 
difference for the renewable plant owner. In the latter case, the total price received per kWh 
(electricity price plus the premium) is less predictable than under the FIT because it depends 
on a volatile electricity price. 
In principle, a mechanism based on a fixed premium – one that reflects an environmental 
bonus for RES and penalizes conventional energy for their externality costs – could establish 
a level playing field allowing fair competition between RES and conventional power sources. 
Such schemes have the advantage of allowing renewables to penetrate the market quickly as 
their production costs drop below the electricity-price-plus-premium. Together with other 
incentives and considerations which taxes conventional power sources in accordance with 
their environmental impact, well-designed fixed premium schemes are theoretically one of the 
most effective ways of promoting electricity from RES. 
Regulatory quantity driven strategies 
Under these schemes, the policy makers set a desired quota or goal, usually with a target 
date, to encourage the market penetration of RES. Examples include: 
 
• Tendering or bidding schemes which call for tenders to acquire specific amounts of capacity 
or generation from specified types of RES. Competition between bidders leads to the 
winners of contracts which will receive a guaranteed tariff for a specified period of time 
• Tradable certificate schemes such as renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which are 
popular in the US, or tradable green certificates (TGC) in Europe. These schemes typically 
obligate one or more parties involved in the electricity supply chain such as the generators, 
wholesalers, distribution companies, or retailers to acquire a certain percentage of electricity 
from RES in their energy mix. Most schemes allow parties to trade certificates to 
demonstrate compliance. Certificates can be obtained in three ways:   
• From their own renewable electricity generation; 
• By purchasing renewable electricity and associated certificates from other generators; and  
• By purchasing certificates without purchasing the actual power from a generator or 
broker. 
The price of the certificates is determined by a market for certificates, such as in Nord 
Pool.  
Voluntary approaches 
Voluntary schemes are based on the willingness of consumers to pay a premium for green 
energy. There are two main categories: 
• Investment based schemes driven where individuals voluntarily contribute to renewable 
energy by providing up-front capital and 
• Generation based schemes where consumers pay a volumetric premium for renewable 
electricity deliveries. 
 
Indirect strategies  
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Aside from the schemes already mentioned, there are other strategies which may have an 
indirect impact on the dissemination of renewables, including the following: 
•         Various forms of eco-taxes on electricity produced from non-renewable sources such as 
carbon taxes, sulphur taxes, or other7; 
•         CO2 emission allowances which are the subject of much talk8; and 
•         Removal of subsidies previously given to fossil and nuclear generation. 
Indirect schemes could also include regulatory and institutional assistance including 
preferential permitting and siting, easy connection to the grid and the operational concessions 
that makes it easy to feed RES-generated power into the system. This is particularly important 
because most RES generation tends to be intermittent and unpredictable.  
Preferential permitting and siting can reduce potential oppositions to RES plants if they 
address issues of concern, such as noise and visual or environmental impacts. Regulations can 
be used to set aside specific locations for development and/or to omit areas of higher risk of 
environmental damage or injury to birds.  
Standardisation of interconnecting RES-generated power to the grid can ease 
requirements that are often overly burdensome and inconsistent and can lead to high 
transaction costs for RES project developers9. Safety requirements are essential, in particular 
in the case of the interconnection in weak parts of the grid. However, unusually burdensome 
criteria on interconnections can lead to higher prices for access to the grid – or in cases are 
used as an excuse to deny access. Clarity, transparency and reasonableness of safety and 
interconnection requirements are critical. Moreover the rules must be clear and fair for 
distribution of additional costs imposed by RES on the network. Finally, there must be clear 
rules delineating responsibility for physical balancing associated to intermittent production 
from some RES-E technologies, in particular wind power10. 
Historical milestones 
The birth of today’s modern renewable energy industries may be traced largely to the 
pioneering efforts of private Danish investors and developers in the early 1970s and to the 
passage in the U.S. of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), which 
arguably introduced the earliest form of a mandatory feed-in law in the power industry. The 
state of California, long a proponent of alternative forms of generation, developed an 
attractive and generous subsidy scheme – called standard contract for qualifying facilities or 
QFs – which, when combined with available federal and state tax credits, stimulated the 
deployment of renewable energy projects. Both PURPA and the California scheme, however, 
had their drawbacks because, arguably, they did not provide an adequate incentive for the 
deployment of efficient technologies.11.  
                                                 
7
 Promotion of renewable electricity via energy or environmental taxes can be achieved either by exempting RES 
from energy taxes or by providing a partial or total refund of any taxes collected. 
8
 Refer to section on global climate change for further discussion 
9
 A companion chapter discusses regulatory aspects of encouraging distributed generation, RES and combined 
heat and power (CHP) 
10
 These issues have become pronounced in countries like Germany and Denmark, with significant penetration of 
wind 
11
 Although the federal government plays an important role in providing tax incentives for renewables, states 
have historically been the innovators in supporting the commercial application of RES technologies in the US. 
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Some critics have characterized the aggressive promotion of renewables in California as 
too much, too soon, and at too high a price12. In contrast, the Danes implemented a testing and 
certification procedure for wind turbines as early as 1978 as a pre-condition for receiving 
subsidies resulting in high reliability and productivity (Meyer, 2004a and 2004b).  
In the early 1990s, promotional programs based on regulated and obligatory tariffs for the 
purchase of electricity from specified renewable sources became common and were refined in 
various European countries. The most important schemes include fixed FIT and fixed 
premium systems used in Denmark, Germany, and Spain to good effect.  Under these 
schemes, utilities are legally obliged to pay the prescribed FIT as long as the RES plants meet 
certain technical standards. Not surprisingly, the 1990s saw a wind power boom in Europe – 
especially in Germany, Denmark and Spain where generous FIT schemes were introduced. 
More than 80% of the European wind capacity installed at the end of the 1990s was located in 
these three countries. The competitive tendering system, favoured in the UK and France has 
had limited success. 
Meanwhile, in the U.S., after an initial growth spurt in the 1980s, the 1990s saw relatively 
little new development as the standard offers established in California and other states were 
no longer aggressively promoted.   
With the ongoing liberalisation of electricity markets across Europe and other countries, 
tradable green certificates (TGC), based on quota obligations for RES have become more 
prominent. In Europe this scheme has been tried in Italy, the UK and Sweden in different 
variations, so far without great success. The first application of such a quota based system 
occurred in the U.S., at the state level with or without TGC. Renewable energy quotas have 
recently become the most popular support scheme in the US and an increasing number of 
states have implemented them. 
In general, whilst the main goal of early subsidies was to increase the supply security and 
fuel diversity, the focus of programs in recent years has shifted to reduce the emission of 
greenhouse gases. Table 2 summarises the most important historical milestones for 
promotional strategies.  
                                                 
12
 This colorful phrase is attributed to Michael Peevey, a senior vice president at Southern California Edison at 
the time and currently the Chairman of the California Public Utilities Commission. 
 11 
Table 2. Historical overview on promotion strategies for electricity generation from 
renewables (Haas et al, 2007) 
Year Country Type of strategy Program name Technologies addressed 
1979-1989 DK Investment subsidies   Wind, biogas 
1978-1989 US Feed-in tariffs/Tax relief PURPA All technologies (except Large hydro) 
1989-1996 DE Investment subsidies plus feed-in tariffs "100/250 MW Wind Programm" Wind 
1991-1993 DE Investment subsidies plus feed-in tariffs "1000-Dächer-Program" PV 
1990-1999 UK Tendering system NFFO / SRO / NI-NFFO Selected technologies 
1990-present DE Feed-in tariffs "Einspeisetarif" PV, Wind, Biomass, Small hydro 
1992-1994 AT Investment subsidies plus feed-in tariffs 200 kW PV-Program PV 
1992-1997 IT Feed-in tariffs “CIP 6/92” All technologies  
1994-present US Tax relief Tax production credits   Varies over time; focus on wind 
1991-1996 SE Investment subsidies /Tax relief   Wind, Solar , Biomass 
1992-1999 DK Feed-in tariff   Wind, Biomass 
1992-1999 DE, CH, AT Feed-in tariffs "Kostendeckende Vergütung" PV 
1994-present GR Investment  
subsidies 
1994-now: Operational Program 
for Energy and Competitiveness” 
PV, Wind, Biomass, Small hydro, 
Geothermal,  
1994-present ES Feed-in tariffs or fixed premium systems 
“Royal Decree 2366/1994” resp. 
“Royal Decree 436/2004”  All technologies (except Large hydro) 
1994-2005 JP Investment subsidies “Residential PV System Dissemination Program” PV 
1994-present JP Voluntary net-metering “surplus electricity purchase 
menu” 
PV 
1996-present DE, CH, NL, AT, UK Voluntary green tariffs Various brands Selected technologies 
1996-present CH Voluntary stock 
exchange "Solarstrombörse" PV 
1997-present FI Tax incentives Energy Tax Wind, mini hydro (<1MW), wood based fuels 
1998-present DE Labelled “Green Electricity” 
TÜV, Grüner Stromlabel e.V., 
Öko-Institut PV, Wind, Biomass, Small hydro 
1999-present DE Soft loans “100,000 Dächer-Programm” PV 
1999-2000 NL (Voluntary)  Green certificates   
All technologies (exempt municipal 
waste incineration) 
2000-present DE, FIT Regulated Rates “Renewable energy act” Selected technologies 
1998-present US 
Quota obligation with 
TGC/Renewable 
Energy Funds 
“Renewables Portfolio Standards” 
“Clean Energy Funds” Selected technologies 
2001-2004  IT Rebates “Tetti fotovoltaici” PV 
2002-present  ES FIT/premium    All technologies 
2002-present IT, UK, BE Quota obligation with TGC  
All technologies (wave, waste and 
large hydro depend on the country) 
2003-present JP Quota obligation with TGC “Renewables portfolio standard” 
PV, Wind, Biomass, Small hydro 
(<=1MW), Geothermal 
2003-present  AT FIT  “Ökostromgesetz” All technologies 
2003-present  SE Quota obligation with TGC  All technologies. No waste 
2003-present NL Mixed Strategy (FITs,  tax incentives, TGC) 
MEP (Environmental Quality of 
Power Generation  
All technologies except hydro and 
“non pure” biomass 
2005-present IT PV feed in “Conto Energia” PV 
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Table 3 provides an overview of more recent promotion schemes to support electricity 
generation form RES in the countries investigated. In Europe, FITs serve as the main policy 
instrument, with the exception of Finland, which exclusively uses tax credits and investment 
incentives for the promotion of RES. 
Table 3. Current promotion strategies for electricity from RES in major EU countries, the US, 
and Japan 
RES-E TECHNOLOGIES CONSIDERED  
Major 
strategy Large Hydro Small Hydro 
‘New’ RES (Wind on- & offshore, PV, Solar thermal electricity, 
Biomass, Biogas, Landfill gas, Sewage gas, Geothermal) 
Municipal 
Solid 
Waste 
Austria FITs No Renewable Energy Act 2003. (Ökostromgesetz). Technology-specific FITs guaranteed for 13 years for plants 
which get all permissions between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2004 and, hence, start operation by the 
end of 2006. Investment subsidies mainly on regional level. No decision yet on follow-up support after 2004.  
FITs for 
waste with 
a high 
share of 
biomass 
Belgium Quota/TGC 
+ guaranteed 
electricity 
purchase 
No Federal: The Royal Decree of 10 July 2002 (operational from 1st of July 2003) sets minimum prices (i.e. FITs) for RES-E.13
On regional level promotion activities include: Wallonia: Quota-based TGC-system on electricity suppliers – increasing 
from 3% in 2003 up to 12% in 2010. Flanders: Quota-based TGC-system on electricity suppliers – increasing from 3% (no 
MSW) in 2004 up to 6% in 2010. Brussels region: No support scheme yet implemented. 
Cyprus FITs + 
government 
grants 
No Government grants for 30-55 % of investment. FITs are in place since January 2006 and are guaranteed for 15 
years. FIT level in 2006: Wind: 48-92 €/MWh14, Biomass, landfill and sewage: 63 €/MWh, PV up to 5 kW: 
204 €/MWh. 
No 
Czech 
Republic 
FITs and 
Premiums 
No FITs in place since 2002 Adoption of the act in 2005 for plants installed after Jan 2006. Fixed tariff option 
and premium option are offered alternatively and are guaranteed for 15 years in the fixed option. FIT level for 
2006: Wind: 85 €/MWh fixed and 70 €/MWh premium, Small Hydro: 81 €/MWh fixed and 49 €/MWh 
premium, Biomass/biogas: 77-103 €/MWh fixed and 44-69 €/MWh premium, biomass cofiring: 19-
41 €/MWh premium, Geothermal: 156 €/MWh fixed and 126 €/MWh premium, PV: 456 €/MWh fixed and 
435 €/MWh premium.  
 
Denmark FITs and 
Premiums, 
Net metering 
for PV 
No Act on Payment for Green Electricity (Act 478): Fixed (and low) premium prices instead of former high FITs 
for wind onshore. Tendering for offshore wind. Biomass and biogas receive FITs of 80 €/MWh for the first 
10 years, 54 €/MWh for the next 10 years. Net metering for PV used for individual houses 
Subsidies 
available 
for CHP-
plants 
using 
waste.. 
Estonia FITs No Purchase obligation of RES-E only valid for amount of network losses. Level of FIT since 2003: 52 €/MWh 
for all RES guaranteed for 12 years. Programme will expire in 2015. 
No 
Finland Tax  
Exemption 
No Tax refund:  
4.2 € /MWh  
(plant <1MW) 
Mix of tax refund and investment subsidies:Tax refund of 6.9 €/MWh 
for Wind and of 4.2 €/MWh for other RES-E. Investment subsidies up 
to 40% for Wind and up to 30 % for other RES-E. 
Tax refund
(2.5 
€/MWh) 
France FITs No Up to mid 2007 FITs for RES-E plant < 12 MW (wind plants are not due to the capacity limit) guaranteed for 
15 years (20 years PV and Hydro). Tenders for plant >12 MW. After mid 2007 no limitation of capacity for 
FITs, provided that the equipement are in specific zones decided by local communities and regional 
administrations. (Energy act of July 2005). FITs in more detail: Biomass: 49-61 €/MWh, Biogas and 
methanisation: 75 – 90 €/MWh, including premium for energy efficiency up to 120 €/MW, including 
premium for "methanisation" up to 140 €/MWh, Geothermal: 76-79 €/MWh, PV: 300 €/MWh (20 years) 
including premium (for "integration in buildings") up to 550 €/MWh; Sewage and landfill gas: 45-60 €/MWh; 
Wind Onshore15: 28-82 €/MWh; Wind Offshore16: 30-130 €/MWhHydro17: 54.9-61 €/MWh.  
FIT: 45
50 €/MWh
Germany FITs Only  
refurbi
shmen
t 
Novel of German Renewable Energy Act in 2004: FITs guaranteed for 20 years18. In more detail, FITs for 
new installations (2006) are: Hydro: 66.5-96.7 €/MWh (30 years); Wind19: 52.8-83.6 €/MWh; Biomass & 
Biogas: 81.5-171.6 €/MWh; Landfill-, Sewage- & Landfill gas: 64.5-74.4 €/MWh; PV: 406-568 €/MWh; 
Geothermal: 71.6-150 €/MWh 
No 
Greece FITs +  
investment 
subsidies 
No FITs guaranteed for 12 years with the possible extension to 20 years.Tariff level:20 Wind onshore, small 
hydro, geothermal, biomass & biogas: 73 €/MWh (mainland) and 84.6 €/MWh (islands); Wind offshore: 
90 €/MWh (mainland and islands); Solar Thermal: 230-250 €/MWh (mainland) and 250-270 MWh (islands); 
PV: 400-450 €/MWh (mainland) and 450-500 €/MWh (islands)  
 and a investment incentives: 30-40 % of investment incentives or 100 % tax exemption are offered by law 
3299/2004. Reduction of taxable income of up to 20%.   
No 
Hungary FITs + soft 
loans 
FIT: 
35-69 
Technology-specific FITs since 2005. Tariff level (2006)21: Geothermal, biomass, biogas, small hydro 
(<5MW): 39-108 €/MWh, Solar and wind: 95 €/MWh; Cogeneration: 36-69 €/MWh. Soft loans from the 
Waste: 39-
108 
                                                 
13  FITs are guaranteed on national level for the first 10 years of operation, e.g. in case of offshore wind in size of 90 €/MWh. Note, they can only be claimed 
exclusively – in other words, they cannot be claimed if support is given by the regional TGC-systems 
14
 Stepped FIT: 92 €/MWh for the first 5 years of operation and then between 48 and 92€/MWh for the next 10 years.  
15  Stepped FIT: 82 €/MWh for the first 
10 years of operation and then between 28 and 82 €/MWh for the next 5 years depending on the quality of site. 
16  Stepped FIT: 130 €/MWh for the first 10 years of operation and then between 30 and 130 €/MWh for the next 10 years depending on the quality of site. 
17  Producers can choose between four different schemes. The figure shows the flat rate option. Within other schemes tariffs vary over time (peak/base etc.). 
18  The law includes a dynamic reduction of the FITs: For biomass 1.5 % per year, for PV 6.5 % per year, for wind 2 % and for geothermal 1 % per year.  
19  Stepped FIT: In case of onshore wind 83.6 €/MWh for the first 5 years of operation and then between 52.8 and 83.6 €/MWh depending on the quality of site. 
20  Depending on location (islands or mainland).  
21
  Tariffs are differentiated depending on load distribution. 
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€/MW
h 
Hungarian development bank. €/MWh 
Ireland FIT No FITs are granted for 15 years. Tariff level (2006): Wind: 57-59 €/MWh; Landfill gas: 70 €/MWh; Other 
Biomass: 72 €/MWh; small hydro: 72 €/MWh. 
No 
Italy Quota/TGC 
+ FITs for 
PV 
Quota obligation (TGC-system) on electricity suppliers: 3.05% target (2006), increasing yearly 0,35% up to 2008; TGC issued for all 
(new) RES-E (incl. large Hydro and MSW) – with rolling redemption22; no penalty;   12,528 €/MWh (2006 ) to purchase TGCs from 
the grid operator, but market distortions appear23. Feed in tariff for PV and locally investment subsidies from regional 
administrations . 
Latvia Quota + FITs  The FIT-scheme has been replaced with a yearly quota system in 2003, but some RES-E producers continue 
receiving the FITs. However, political framework conditions for the support of RES-E are currently under 
development. 
No 
Lithuania FITs No FITs are in place since 2002. Tariff level: small hydro: 57.9 €/MWh; Wind: 63.7 €/MWh; Biomass: 
57.9 €/MWh. The implementation of a quota obligation is planned for 2021. 
No 
Netherlands No support 
system 
No FIT-scheme was abolished in summer 2006 since the government expects to fulfill the 2010 target set by the 
EC without further financial support and RES-E support costs were higher than expected. 
No 
Poland Quota/TGC  Poland applies a green power purchase obligation since 2003 and started the certificate trading in December 
2005. The quota target to be fulfilled is set at 3.6 % in 2006 and increases up to 7.5 % in 2010. 
 
Portugal FITs +  
investment 
subsidies 
No FITs (Decree Law 33-A/2005) and investment subsidies of roughly 40% (Measure 2.5 (MAPE) within 
program for Economic Activities (POE)) for Wind, PV, Biomass, Small Hydro and Wave. Average FITs in 
2006: Wind24: 74 €/MWh; Wave: n.a. €/MWh; PV25:310-450 €/MWh, Small Hydro: 75 €/MWh  
FIT for 
urban 
waste: 
75 €/MWh
Slovak 
Republik 
FITs and tax 
exemption 
No FITs since 2005 (Decree N°2/2005): Wind: 75.1 €/MWh; Small hydro (<5MW): 61.7 €/MWh; Solar: 
214.6 €/MWh; Geothermal: 93.9 €/MWh; Biomass: 72.4 €/MWh. Tax exemption for RES-E in first five 
years of operation. 
No 
Slovenia FITs or 
premiums 
No FITs were introduced in 2004 and are granted for 10 years. There are two alternatives, the fixed tariff option 
and a premium payment which is paid on top of the market price. Tariff levels (2004 – present): Small Hydro: 
59-62 €/MWh (fixed) and 26-28 €/MWh (premium); Biomass: 68-70 €/MWh (fixed) and 34-36 €/MWh 
(premium); Landfill & sewage gas: 49-53 €/MWh (fixed); Biogas: 121 €/MWh (fixed); Wind: 59-61 €/MWh 
(fixed) and 25-27 €/MWh (premium); Geothermal: 59 €/MWh (fixed) and 25 €/MWh (premium); Solar: 65-
374 €/MWh (fixed) and 31-341 €/MWh (premium)  
No 
Spain FITs or 
Fixed 
Premiums 
Depen
d-ing 
on the 
plant 
size26 
 
FITs (Royal Decree 436/2004): RES-E producer have the right to opt for a fixed FIT or for a premium 
tariff27. Both are adjusted by the government according to the variation in the average electricity sale price. In 
more detail (2006): Wind, Biomass, Small Hydro (<25MW), Geothermal: 68.9 €/MWh (fixed) and 
38.3 €/MWh (premium); Solar thermal & PV28: 229.8-440.4 €/MWh 
194 €/MWh, Agricultural and forest residues: 61.3 €/MWh (fixed) and 30.6 (premium). Moreover, soft loans 
and tax incentives (according to “Plan de Fomento de las Energías Renovables”) and investment subsidies on 
regional level 
FIT: 
53.6 €/MW
h (fixed) or 
23 €/MWh 
(premium) 
Sweden Quota/TGC No Quota obligation (TGC-system) on consumers: Increasing from 7.4% in 2003 up to 16.9% in 2010. For Wind 
Investment subsidies of 15% and additional small premium FITs (“Environmental Bonus”29) are available. 
No 
United 
Kingdom 
Quota/TGC No Quota obligation (TGC-system) for all RES-E: Increasing from 3% in 2003 up to 10.4% by 2010 – Buyout 
price is set at 32.33 £/MWh for 2005/2006. In addition to the TGC system, eligible RES-E are exempt from 
the Climate Change Levy certified by Levy Exemption Certificates (LEC’s), which cannot be separately 
traded from physical electricity. The current levy rate is 4.3 £/MWh. Investment grants in the frame of 
different programs (e.g. Clear Skies Scheme, DTI´s Offshore Wind Capital Grant Scheme, the Energy Crops 
Scheme, Major PV Demo Program and the Scottish Community Renewable Initiative) 
No 
                                                 
22  In general only plant put in operation after 1st of April 1999 are allowed to receive TGCs for their produced green electricity. Moreover, this allowance is 
limited to the first 8 years of operation (rolling redemption). 
23  GSE (Italian  Agency for  renewable support schemes)  influences strongly the certificates market selling its own 
certificates at a regulated price – namely at a price set by law as the average of the prices paid to acquire electricity from 
RES-E plant under the former FIT-programme (CIP6) minus the income from the sale os such electricity on the market.. 
24  Stepped FIT depending on the quality of the site. 
25  Depending on the size: <5kW: 420 €/MWh or >5kW: 224 €/MWh. 
26  Hydropower plants with a size between 10 to 25 MW receive a tariff of 68.9 €/MWh (fixed) or 38.3 
€/MWh €/MWh, larger plants (25 to 50 MW) can opt for a fixed tariff of 61.3 €/MWh or a premium payment of 
30.6 €/MWh. 
27  In case of a premium tariff, RES-E generators earn in addition to the (compared to fixed rate lower) premium tariff 
the revenues from the selling of their electricity on the power market. 
28  In case of PV the expressed premium tariff refers to plant > 100 KW. For small-scale plants (<100 kW) only a fixed 
FIT is applied. 
29  Decreasing gradually down to zero in 2009  
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United 
States 
Quota/TGC 
+ tax 
incentives + 
state funds 
No Quota obligations established in 21 U.S. states – covering 40% of U.S. load – by 2006.  Design and level of 
quotas varies by states.  10-year, 1.9 cent/kWh federal production tax credit available to certain “new” RES-E 
sources.  30% federal investment tax credit available fort solar installations.  15 states have developed 
renewable energy funds, typically collected through electricity surcharges, and these funds have developed 
incentive programs that spend roughly $500 million per year on various RES-E technologies, through a 
variety of different kinds of programs.  The largest of these programs involves rebates and production 
incentives for customer-sited photovoltaic systems in California.  
 
Japan Quota/TGC + 
tax incentives + 
voluntary net-
metering 
No Quota obligation (TGC-system): Increasing from 3.3TWh in 2003 up to 12.2TWh (approx. 1.35%) in 2010, 16TWh (approx. 
1.63%) in 2014. TGC issued for all RES-E (exempt large hydro (>1MW), non-biomass fraction of MSW, conventional 
geothermal). Maximum price of TGCs is set at 11JPY/kWh. Voluntary net-metering for PV offered by power companies: 
The current purchase price is about 23JPY/kWh.  
Yes (exempt 
non-biomass 
fraction) 
 
Over time, many countries have gone through major changes and occasional reversals in 
their renewable support policies, either in response to what was or was not working, to make 
it more effective, or in response to political or public sentiment. Figure 4 shows the evolution 
of the main support instrument for selected countries over time. Countries where the FIT has 
been continuously in effect since 1997 are Austria30, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal 
and Spain. Countries with major changes include: 
• The UK and Ireland who replaced their problematic tender schemes by a quota regulation 
in combination with a TGC-market in 2002 and 2005 respectively; 
• A few others including Belgium and Italy who substituted their FIT-systems for a quota 
regulation; 
• Sweden which switched to a quota obligation complementing the already existing tax and 
investment incentives in some cases;  
• The US where tax credits have been complemented by the introduction of RPS 
obligations in a number of states starting in 2000; and 
• Japan which introduced a quota system in 2003 on top of an existing voluntary net 
metering for PV that has been offered by utilities since 1992. 
 
                                                 
30
  with a short interruption for small hydro in 2001 
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Figure 4 Evolution of the main support schemes in EU-15 Member States and in the 
US31 (based on Ragwitz et al. 2007, Wiser et al.2007).  
Institutional and political determinants of policy  
The wide variations in the choice of instruments, their timing and intended goals may be 
largely explained by variations in political developments and intentions of different countries. 
Indeed, one can speculate a strong collation between the choice of instruments, the level of 
FIT or premium offered, and stability of the policies with the institutional and political 
environment in each country. Three main sets of parameters are at play in the institutional 
arena and further described in Box 1.  
                                                 
31
 There are also some limited FITs in the US, but these aren’t too significant and are not indicated in this table 
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• The political, culture and policy style – Countries with a market-oriented political 
culture and a liberalistic government tend to choose the most market-based instrument 
in the belief in the efficiency of market incentives and the desire to make the RES 
promotion instrument compatible with the electricity market principles. 
• The convergence of supply security and CO2 emissions reduction – Countries with 
meagre domestic energy supply and/or little fuel diversity tend to be concerned with 
energy security and may be concerned about CO2 emissions. 
• The absence of a strong conventional energy equipment-related industry – Countries 
who lack major manufacturing capabilities in fossil or nuclear power sector tend to be 
strong proponents of a national RES industry. 
Box 1  
Why European countries differ on their RES promotion policies? 
 
• United Kingdom – UK’s energy sector is focused on market forces and competition 
as the main means of controlling costs. This explains the government’s early reliance 
on tending process with cost cap, and then TGC obligations with buy-out provisions, 
at the expense of effectiveness of the instrument. UK currently enjoys a high degree of 
energy self-sufficiency in conventional energy resources and is less concerned about 
supply security. Moreover, Britain has been able to dramatically reduce emissions by 
replacing coal generation with natural gas. 
• Germany - The promotion of RES is primarily driven by the politics of CO2 
reduction, the phase out of nuclear energy and an increased dependence on imported 
energy. This explains why Germany was among the two first countries to introduce 
generous and stable FIT instruments. 
• Denmark - Since 1990s the Danish government has given high priority to RES and 
energy conservation for environmental reasons. Wind power has traditionally been 
promoted through generous schemes. Another motivating factor has been a fast 
growing domestic wind power industry. The Danish strategy has changed after a shift 
of government in 2001. The incoming liberal-conservative government is relying 
mainly on market forces to promote RES. As a result no net increase in land based 
wind power has taken place since 2003. 
• Spain - Increasing energy dependence and CO2 emissions are major issues. Spanish 
government and industries feel constrained by a nuclear moratorium. The regional and 
local communities contribute to the momentum by helping to facilitate the planning 
and location process. 
• Italy - Cogeneration and renewables have been promoted since the 1990s under a FIT 
system inspired by the PURPA experience in the US and to alleviate investment 
constraints. Renewables are also seen as contributing to reduce the country’s growing 
energy imports exasperated by the nuclear moratorium of the mid-1980s. Italy has 
adopted intensive market reforms and has introduced a TGC system in place of the 
FIT system to be consistent in its electricity market reform. 
• France - Thanks to the powerful political lobby for nuclear energy, France relies on 
atom for roughly 70% of its electricity generation, complemented by hydro 
production. Energy equipment manufacturing industry is quite successful in the 
exports markets. A renewables policy was developed to maintain the nuclear option 
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while giving a perception of support for renewables. Despite the adoption of a 
generous FIT system in 2001, the net effect has been modest to date due to planning 
and siting difficulties. 
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4. Comparison of strategies  
This section summarizes the major national programs which have been implemented in 
different counties including a description of support system and policy targets including and 
changes over time; a discussion of the attractiveness of the scheme from investors’ point-of-
view; an overview of the effect of the policy as well as an overview of the pros and con of 
alternatives. 
Feed-in tariffs and premiums 
In Europe, FIT began to attract attention in the late 1980s especially in Denmark, 
Germany and Italy followed by Spain in 1990s. It is the most widely used promotion 
instrument in Europe. Figure 5 shows variations in FIT for electricity from onshore wind 
turbines between 2003 and 2005 32 indicating a broad range of support, some varying over 
time. In 2005, the schemes varied between from 60 and 90 EUR/MWh due to differences in 
wind conditions and different levels of support in different countries.  
The FITs attract a lot of capacity, since a fixed tariff is guaranteed, but only if the FIT is 
set at a level sufficient to meet investors’ needs. This is evident in countries with substantial 
growth in wind power such as in Denmark in the 1990s, and Germany and Spain in the recent 
past.  
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Fig. 5. FITs for electricity generated from onshore wind in selected European countries  
The experience of US, Germany and Spain with FIT are highlighted below. 
 
 Implementation of PURPA in the US  
The earliest form of a mandatory FIT may be traced to Public Utilities Regulatory Policy 
Act of 1978 (PURPA) in the US. PURPA required utilities to purchase power from qualifying 
facilities (QF) including small renewable generators and combined heat and power plants. 
                                                 
32
 The performance of  FIT is discussed in section 5. 
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Pricing varied by state but, especially in California, prices were tied to the price of the 
marginal conventional fossil fuel, which was high and projected to increase at the time, 
yielding highly attractive returns to renewable energy investors (Martinot et al. 2005).  
PURPA faced early legal challenges, but once it was underway, and where it was 
implemented aggressively, it enabled an environment in which renewable developers could 
secure financing for their projects because they could sell their output under attractively 
priced long-term standard contracts. There was little risk under the scheme. 
PURPA was implemented differently in each state. The state of California developed a 
particularly generous standard contract, some as long 15-30 years with a fixed tariff for the 
first 10 years of facility operation. Combined with favourable state and federal tax credits, the 
growth of QF capacity, which included renewables, was astounding, aided by California’s 
diverse and abundant renewable energy resources. Over a short period of time, about 12,000 
MW of geothermal, small hydro, bio-power, solar thermal, and wind power capacities were 
constructed in the US in the 1980s, of which more than half were in California (Martinot et al. 
2005). 
But PURPA also had unintended negative consequences.  By providing high profitability, 
it created an over-heated renewable energy market in which project development arguably 
occurred at a pace that exceeded the ability of the industry to efficiently deliver.  Moreover, 
because the incentives were capacity based, there was more of an incentive to deploy capacity 
(MW) rather than generate electricity (MWh). Finally, because of the generous incentives that 
were offered and the high number of project failures, PURPA-inspired QFs resulted in a 
backlash within the regulated utility industry, which was obligated to buy the power, but also 
within the financial community and among some policy makers. This negative reaction 
arguably set the industry back to some degree (e.g., Martinot 2005, Wiser 2006). Partly as a 
result of these factors, the US renewable energy market remained largely stagnant between 
the late 1980s and the year 2000 as state level implementation of PURPA became less 
aggressive and certain Federal and state tax incentives were allowed to expire.   
 
 Implementation of FIT in Germany 
In Germany, a fixed FIT scheme has been in place since 1991 when the Electricity Feed-
in Act was passed. In 2000 this act was substituted by the Renewable Energy Act and a 12.5% 
target for the share of RES in electricity generation to be achieved by 2010 was established. 
The most important change has been the uncoupling of the tariff level from the electricity 
retail price and the setting of new tariffs based on the actual generation costs of a technology. 
This means that tariffs are not only differentiated by technology, but also within a given 
technology. Moreover, the tariff is adjusted according to location-specific generation costs 
influenced by wind speed, size of a plant or the fuel type in case of biomass.  
Another feature of the Renewable Energy Act is a tariff degression for new installations 
designed to encourage technological development and learning. The act was amended in 2004 
with a 20% target for the share of renewables in electricity generation by 2020. The FIT for 
onshore wind has been reduced and sites with poor wind conditions have been excluded. 
Tariffs for geothermal electricity, small-scale biomass plants and PV were increased. 
Furthermore, additional bonuses were granted for innovative technologies and refurbishment 
of large hydro plants. Investment security for generators of green electricity is virtually 
guaranteed by FITs for a time scale of up to 20 years. 
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As shown in Figure 6 depicts, roughly two third of the increase in electricity generation 
from RES of about 40 TWh since the early 1990s may be attributed to onshore wind. Since 
2000 – the year of the implementation of the Renewable Energy Act – more wind capacity 
has been connected to the German grid than all previous years. By 2005, Germany was 
getting about 11% of its electricity from RES in 2005, compared to about 4% in 1997. 
Despite the impressive gains, the German FIT scheme has its share of critics, mostly large 
incumbent utilities and energy intensive customers who complain about the extra cost burden 
for the promotion of RES. Proponents of the FIT point out (Figure 23) that the German 
scheme is only marginally more generous than others in Europe. Another problem is that wind 
power plants are concentrated in the Northern part of Germany straining the local 
transmission network, which is also influencing load flows in neighbouring European 
countries. In balance, the German FIT may be considered a success story, albeit coming at a 
price. 
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Figure 6. Impact of German FIT on RES in Germany 
 Source: International Energy Agency 2006, Eurostat 2006 
 
 FIT in Spain 
The dominant policy instrument for the promotion of electricity from renewables in Spain 
is an FIT, which has been in place since 199433. The same year, Spain established a 12% 
national target for renewables in total energy consumption by 2010. To further encourage 
investment in wind, the FIT scheme was amended in 2004 to effectively guarantee payments 
during the whole lifetime of a plant and additional incentives were introduced. Green 
electricity can either be sold in the market by using a bidding system or through bilateral 
contracts. By the end of 2004, the overall remuneration level under the market option has 
increased more than was expected due to rising electricity market prices. 
                                                 
33
 In 1998 two alternative payment options for green electricity generation were introduced, a fixed tariff scheme 
and a premium tariff, which was paid on top of the electricity market price. The choice is valid for one year, after 
which the generator may decide to maintain the tariff option or change to the alternative option. Under both 
payment options, grid connection and purchase of the green electricity are guaranteed 
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Figure 7. Growth of electricity generation from renewables excluding large hydro in 
Spain 
 Source: Eurostat 2006 
 
As a result of these favourable conditions, the deployment of RES in Spain started to take 
off in the late 1990s with 30 TWh of additional generation in 2006, mostly from onshore wind 
(Figure 7). The only criticism of the scheme is that the premiums offered may be too generous 
for wind generators. Yet, by and large, the Spanish scheme may be characterized as another 
European success story because it has resulted in a significant increase in deployment of 
renewables with modest subsidies (Figures 5 and 12) in a relatively short period of time. 
Continuity and stability of the policy even under changing governments have contributed 
significantly to the success of the policy.  
Bidding/Tendering systems 
Government tendering schemes to promote RES have been used in the 1990s in France 
(for wind energy and biomass), Ireland (The Irish Alternative Energy Requirement), Denmark 
(the last two off-shore wind farms) and the UK, as well as in many states in the U.S. The most 
well-known of these promotion strategies is the non-fossil fuel obligation (NFFO) in England 
and Wales, which is further described below. Similar schemes have been used in Scotland 
(Scottish Renewables Order, SRO), and Northern Ireland, NI-NFFO). 
However, in most cases, the schemes did not work effectively and starting in 2001/2002 
the competitive tendering schemes were abandoned. Figure 8 compares the relative 
effectiveness of bidding vs FITs for wind energy in Europe prior to 2001 clearly showing the 
superiority of FIT schemes. Partly as a result of this, the UK switched to a renewables 
obligation scheme in 2002. More recently, both Ireland and France have also changed to FIT 
systems.  
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Figure 8. Comparison of the relative effectiveness of FIT and competitive tendering schemes 
in promoting wind power deployment, 1990-2001  
Source: Haas et al 2003 
 UK’s non-fossil fuel obligation (NFFO) 
 
As originally envisioned, the UK’s NFFO was to deliver 1,500 MW of installed capacity 
from RES by the year 2000. The rational for the competitive tendering scheme was to invite 
developers to bid to construct renewable energy capacity. The tendering process would select 
among the viable proposals the least cost options within each technology grouping. To 
facilitate financing, the winners would be awarded relatively long-term contracts, up to 15 
years with a guaranteed surcharge per unit of output for the entire contract period. The 
difference between the surcharge paid to NFFO generators (premium price) and a reference 
price (Pool Selling Price) was to be financed by a levy on all electricity sales of licensed 
electricity suppliers. The costs of this levy34 were to be passed on to consumers (Mitchell, 
1996).  
In total five tendering rounds were conducted in England and Wales resulting in 880 
contracts being awarded. The competitive bidding resulted in declining prices over time as 
expected. Since the first round in 1990, average prices have decreased from 6.5 p/kWh to 2.71 
p/kWh (Figure 9). Even lower prices, less than 2 p/kWh, were obtained in Scotland for wind 
power, lower than electricity from coal, oil, nuclear and some natural gas. The scheme 
provided revenue security as long as the plant operated. On surface, this appeared to be a 
successful scheme. 
However, things did not go smoothly in practice. Many of the awarded contracts did not 
materialize while others failed to meet the expected capacity targets (Figure 10). Many factors 
contributed to this including submission of unrealistic bid prices to secure a contract and 
failure to obtain planning and other consents. Similar experiences with contract failure have 
been common in other bidding schemes (e.g., Wiser et al. 2006a). One lesson from this 
experience is that tendering schemes lacking penalties for non-delivery may be deficient 
compared with other subsidy schemes. In 2002, the NFFO was replaced by the renewable 
                                                 
34
 The levy remains now only to continue the previously contracted arrangements. 
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obligation,RO (see section 4.4) while contracts already awarded continue to be valid under the 
older terms. 
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Figure 9. Bid prices under NFFO in England & Wales, prices in EUR-cent/kWh  
Source: www.ofgem.uk 
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Figure 10. Capacities installed vs. projected under NFFO in England & Wales  
Source: www.ofgem.uk 
 
Quota-based Trading systems 
Alternative forms of quota-based systems are now in place in five EU countries, in some 
21 states and the District of Columbia in the U.S. and in Japan. The European quota systems 
are based on tradable generation certificates, TGC (Table 4) while in the US, the schemes are 
referred to as renewable portfolio standards, RPS (Table 5).  
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Table 4. Quota-based TGC systems in EU and Japan  
Source: Ragwitz et al 2007, METI 2007 
 UK Belgium 
(Flanders) 
Belgium 
(Walloon) 
Italy Poland Sweden Japan 
Period Start 2002 Start 2002 Start 2002 Start 2001 Start 2005 Start 2003 Start 2003 
Obligation 3% in 2003, 10.4 % in 
2010 
1.2% (2003), 2% 
(2004) increasing up 
to 6% in 2010  
3% in 2003 
increasing up to 12% 
in 2010  
From September 
2010 onward, the 
quota will be 
multiplied by 1.01 
2% in 2002 and  
increased annually by 
0.35% between 2004 
and 2008 
7.5% in 2010 7.4%  in 2003, 16.9% in 
2010 
approximately 0.4% in 2003 
approximately 1.4% in 2010 
approximately 1.6% in 2014 
obligation on Supplier Supplier Supplier Producers and 
importers 
Supplier End-user Supplier 
technology bands 
(baskets) within 
overall quota 
No (introduction of 
technology banding is 
planned for the future) 
No No No No No No 
involved technologies small hydro****, wind, 
biomass, solar -, geo-
thermal energy, no 
waste 
all renewables, no 
solid municipal 
waste 
all renewables and 
high quality CHP 
all new renewables 
(incl. large hydro, 
MSW, hydrogen and 
CHP ), 
Small and large 
hydro, wind, 
biomass 
small hydro (<1,5 MW), 
large hydro (only some 
cases), wind, biomass, 
geothermal, wave 
PV, Wind, Biomass, Small 
hydro up to 1MW, 
Geothermal (exempt 
conventional type) 
Existing plants 
eligible 
No Yes Yes No (for certificate 
issue), Yes (for quota 
fulfillment) 
No Yes (small hydro) Yes 
international trade 
allowed 
No. No No yes, but only in 
exchange with physical 
electricity and with 
countries that allow 
reciprocity 
No  Trading scheme with 
Norway planned BUT NOW 
ABOLISHED 
No 
Floor price not planned.  at federal level: From 1st of July 2003 
onward  the grid operator is obliged to buy 
TGC issued anywhere in Belgium for the 
minimum prices per TGC (in size of 
1MWh) of: 
offshore wind 90 €, on-shore wind 50€, 
hydro: 50€, solar energy: 150€, biomass: 
20€, Within the Wallon-region, RES-E 
producers may exchange their TGC for a 
subsidy at a fixed price of 65 €. 
Not planned No Floor prices for the 
introductory phase (in 
€/MWh):  
2003: 6.6; 2004: 5.5; 2005: 
4.4; 2006: 3.3; 2007: 2.2; 
from 2008 onwards no floor 
price is planned. 
No 
Penalty The Buy out price is  
£30,51/MWh (for 
2003/2004) 
(~45 €/MWh) 
75 €/MWh (in 2003;  
10 €/MWh in 2004; 
and 125 €/MWh in 
2005 
From 1st of April 
2003 onward: 100 
€/MWh (100€ per 
missing TGC in size 
of 1MWh) 
No penalty is set; the 
grid operator sells 
certificates at a fixed 
price 12,528 €/MWh 
(2006) 
The Buy out price is  
100 EUR/MWh 
150% of the market price – 
but with a maximum of 
about 19 €/MWh in 2004, 
and 26 €/MWh in 2005 
1 million JPY to non 
fulfillment supplier. 
Trading scheme stock exchange stock exchange Open, trading and 
direct support 
bilateral  or in the TGC  
Market. 
Power exchange open bilateral or in the market 
managed by private brokers 
 
A comparison of recent TGC prices are presented in Figure 11, showing relatively flat 
price levels in most countries, over this three-year period, but wide disparities in pricing 
across systems. . The salient features of some of the schemes follow.  
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Figure 11. Comparison of  TGCs35 price levels in selected countries 
Sources: Held et al 2006, METI 2006, Wiser et al. 2007. 
 European TGC schemes  
Currently, quota-based TGC systems are in effect in the UK, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, and 
Poland. In the UK, Belgium and Poland suppliers have to demonstrate compliance with the 
obligation; in Sweden the end-users are responsible while in Italy the quota has to be fulfilled 
by the producers and in a rather complicated way described below. In all cases the obligations 
can be met by: 
• Producing certificates by generating electricity from qualifying renewable plants; 
• Purchasing TGCs from other eligible generators, other suppliers, traders, or through 
organized exchanges; or 
• Paying a penalty or “Buy-Out Price” set by the regulatory authority. 
In the UK the Renewables Obligation (RO) scheme came into effect in 2002, starting at   
3.4% coverage of electricity demand for the period of 2003/2004, gradually increasing to 
10.4% by 2010/2011 and remaining at that level until 2027. The major problems with the 
British RO scheme are that certificate prices are high, although slightly decreasing from 2003 
to 2005 (Figure 11), and that so far the quota has never been fulfilled. For example in 2004 
only 2.2 % of electricity has been generated from new RES vs. the 3.4 % specified in the 
quota36. 
There are several explanation for this. In fact, not meeting the target is also a function of 
at least37 three major factors: (i) the low penalty, respectively the fact that this penalty is 
recycled to the renewable generators (see above); (ii) location and permitting constraints; and 
                                                 
35
 Since TGC prices in the US vary by state, Massachusetts and Texas are used as examples 
36
 Notice that, because of multi-riks for the producers, developers and for obligated suppliers, most of the quotas 
are complied within long term contracts between suppliers and producers and the exchange of certificates does 
not play the role that the theory could suggest.  
 
37
 Of course, more investigations are necessary to get detailed insight on the effects of a hybrid instrument 
(control by quantity –the quota – and by price –the buy out price) to explain its poor effectiveness  
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(iii) banking is not allowed so RES generators fear (with good reasons) that the closer they 
come to the quota the lower will be the ROC price. Note that this is despite the fact that long 
term contracts are possible and most of the certificate handling takes place within vertically 
integrated large companies.  
The penalty mechanism in the UK deserves special attention. All penalty payments are 
placed in a central fund. This fund is redistributed to suppliers which have met the obligation 
in proportion to the number of ROCs each supplier has presented. Therefore the real costs for 
a supplier who is not complying with the obligation are higher than their total Buy-Out Price 
payments (‘fines’). In contrast, accomplishing and surpassing the RO target provides 
additional economic incentives. That explains why ROC prices were higher than the Buy-Out 
price in the first years. This situation can be expected as long as the market is short of 
electricity from RES. Figure 12. depicts the number of ROCs issued in UK between October 
2002 and March 2005 by technology and country38. Clearly, in England the cheap options 
landfill gas and biomass co-firing dominate. In Wales and Scotland onshore wind and hydro 
are also among the preferred options. 
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Figure 12. Number of ROCs issued in the period April 2002 to March 2005 by technology 
and country (Note: 1 ROC = 1MWhel). Source: OFGEM (2006) 
Italy introduced its TGC scheme in 2002, obligating all producers and importers of 
electricity to supply 2% of their power from new renewable electricity, with exceptions for 
combined heat and power (CHP) plants, renewables and companies generating less that 100 
GWh.  
Today the situation in Italy is similar to the British case. TGC prices are among the 
highest in Europe39 (Figure 11) mainly because they expire in eight years. Two types of TGC 
                                                 
38
 The UK ROCs system has not directly affected small generators, e.g. roof PV, small wind, and small hydro. 
39
 The high price of the TGCs sold by GSE is due to the mechanism for the price setting. When the generation of 
low price sources like hydro power is low, the weighted average of the price paid for former feed-in contracts is 
higher and so the price of certificates. The same happens when the avoided cost, which has a cost factor related 
to the fuel prices, rises as happened in 2006.  
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are on the market: those from qualified facilities and those sold by the market operator 
Gestore Servizi Elettrici (GSE), who trades the certificates issued to generators under contract 
with the previous FIT program at a price calculated each year. The role of the certificates sold 
by (GSE) is to reconcile the previous FIT scheme with the new, a delicate task since the quota 
of the obligations has to be managed to avoid the supply of certificates from new plants 
exceeds demand, which will result in zero price for the certificates. To facilitate this control 
and give elasticity to the supply, banking of certificates has been allowed for two years. 
In Belgium, two TGC schemes have been in existence in parallel since 2002, one in 
Flanders and the other in Walloon. The former was designed to promote energy generation 
form waste, biomass and wind and it was clear from the beginning that the limited market 
may result in liquidity problems. Currently, TGC prices in Flanders are among the highest in 
Europe (Figure 11). But as shown in Figure 25, if the windfall profits due to the promotion of 
prior capacity are taken into account, the additional costs for customers for generating new 
electricity from RES increase to about 18 cent/kWh (Verbruggen (2005). The current penalty 
for not fulfilling the quota, of the order of 100–125 EUR/MWh, is not considered a major 
barrier since it is in the same range as the actual certificate prices (Figure 11). 
In the case of Sweden, new RES capacity increased significantly in 2004 and 2005 when 
certificate prices were low (Figures 13 and 26). The Swedish quota system allowed some old 
capacity to qualify for certificates40 resulting in a free-rider problem and generating windfall 
profits for plants constructed before the TGC scheme went into effect. The availability of 
additional tax incentives and investment subsidies, especially for wind power plants, has 
contributed to the problems. 
 Renewable portfolio standards in the US 
In the US Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) have become the most common 
instrument for promotion of renewables at the state level, with 21 states and the District of 
Columbia adopting such schemes (Langniss and Wiser 2003, Wiser et al 2007). These 
schemes collectively encompass 40% of electricity supply in the US and set minimum 
standards for renewable energy in the energy mix. As detailed in Wiser et al. (2005), the 
design of quotas varies considerably across states (see Table 5).   
Table 5. Current RPS schemes in the US (Source: Wiser et al. 2007) 
State Start 
Date 
Ultimate 
Target 
Existing 
Plants 
Eligible 
Technology Bands or Tiers 
Arizona 2001 15% (2025) No Yes (Distributed Generation) 
California 2003 20% (2010) Yes No 
Colorado 2007 10% (2015) Yes Yes (Solar) 
Connecticut 2000 10% (2010) Yes Yes (Class I/II Technologies) 
Delaware 2007 10% (2019) Yes  Yes (Vintage) 
Hawaii 2010 20% (2020) Yes No 
Iowa 1999 ~2% (1999) Yes No 
Maine 2000 30% (2000) Yes No 
Maryland 2006 7.5% (2019) Yes  Yes (Class I/II Technologies) 
Massachusetts 2003 4% (2009) No No 
Minnesota 2005 10% (2015) Yes Yes (Biomass, Community Wind) 
                                                 
40
 Recently, this system has been modified and currently mainly new capacities qualify for certificates traded.  
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Montana 2008 15% (2015) No Yes (Community Wind) 
Nevada 2003 20% (2015) Yes Yes (Solar) 
New Jersey 2001 22.5% (2021) Yes Yes (Solar, Class I/II Technologies) 
New Mexico 2006 10% (2011) Yes No 
New York 2006 24% (2013) Yes Yes (Distributed Generation) 
Pennsylvania 2007 8% (2020) Yes Yes (Solar) 
Rhode Island 2007 16% (2020) Yes Yes (Vintage) 
Texas 2002 ~4.2% (2015) Yes  Yes (Goal, Non-Wind) 
Washington 2012 15% (2020) No No 
Washington DC 2007 11% (2022) Yes Yes (Solar, Class I/II Technologies) 
Wisconsin 2001 10% (2015) Yes No 
 
The full effect of these RPS policies has not yet registered since only a few states have 
more than five years of experience and some of the quotas have been set but have not yet 
produced results. In the past few years, however, these policies have begun to have a sizable 
impact on the renewable electricity market in the US41. Figure 13, for example, shows that 
roughly half of the non-hydro renewable energy capacity additions since 2000 in the US have 
occurred in states with quota obligations, most from wind power.  Importantly, because of 
technology set-asides that exist in a number of states, a growing amount of solar energy is 
also being supported by these obligations.  By some estimates, these quota systems could 
result in the installation of over 40 GW of new RES capacity by 2020 generating roughly 3% 
of projected US electric sales.  
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Figure 13. Cumulative non-hydro capacity from renewables in the U.S.  
Source: Black & Veatch 2006 
 
In general, the most successful quota systems in the U.S. are those that have required or 
motivated long-term contracting with RES developers, with short-term contracts of unbundled 
TGCs used as a secondary compliance tool.  These long-term contracts are typically the result 
                                                 
41
 It is important to note that most of the state RPS policies work in combination with federal tax incentives 
available for RES projects. In addition, many of these policies are applied in still-regulated electricity markets in 
which regulated utilities solicit long-term renewable electricity contracts to comply with the standards. 
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of a competitive bidding procedure conducted by retail suppliers obligated to meet the quota.  
Though a significant degree of contract failure has occurred in some states, and government 
oversight has been required in others, many schemes appear to be functioning with efficiency 
and effectiveness.  
In some states where unbundled, short-term trade in TGCs dominate the market, however, 
problems similar to those in the UK have arisen, with TGC prices set by the penalty level, 
rather than based on market forces.  In these instances, renewable electricity projects struggle 
to receive financing, despite potentially high prices and profits due to the risk involved. This 
has especially been the case in restructured electricity markets42, where load obligations are 
uncertain, and retail suppliers have typically been reluctant or unable to enter into longer-term 
contractual arrangements for electricity from renewables or unbundled TGCs43. It remains to 
be seen whether this factor will complicate new project development in the long term  and 
whether the resulting aggregate cost of the quota will be acceptable. 
Though short-term trade in TGC is not common in many of the RPS markets in the US, 
several states have TGC markets that are sufficiently liquid to have transaction price data 
available (in the US, TGCs are referred to as renewable energy certificates, or RECs).. These 
states are typically those in which both retail electric competition and liquid wholesale 
electricity markets exist.  Figure 14 presents monthly data on the average price of RECs in six 
different states and the District of Columbia.   
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Figure 14. REC prices in selected states 
Source: Wiser et al. 2007 
Clearly, TGC prices in the US have experienced considerable variations among markets, 
and even within a single market over time. TGC price differences across markets reflect 
                                                 
42
 Some states have restructured their electricity  markets in the United States to allow competition among retail 
electricity suppliers,while others have not. 
43
 Customers in restructured markets can switch suppliers, adding to retailer uncertainties in securing long-term 
contracts  
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dramatically different state RPS designs as well as differences in available resources, vintage 
and geographic eligibility rules, the level of the RPS compliance target, the cost and 
availability of renewable generation in the region and the level and design of any cost cap, to 
name a few. Variations in TGC prices within a given market and over time reflect the 
influence of changes in RPS rules or expectations of those rules, the actual and/or expected 
speed of renewable energy development relative to the RPS targets and the degree of 
competition for renewable energy from other states or from the voluntary green power 
market, among other factors.  
In a number of states, a variety of design pitfalls including the following have been 
experienced, causing quota systems to under-perform: 
• Uncertainty in the duration or design of the quota policy; 
• Quota targets and eligibility rules that do not require new renewable capacity 
development; 
• Unclear or inadequate enforcement of the quota; 
• Quota targets that are too aggressive to be achieved; 
• Extensive exemptions of potential retail suppliers obligated to meet the quota; and 
• Inadequate compliance flexibility. 
Overall, experience with the quota schemes in the US has been decidedly mixed. Where 
the RPS scheme is mainly based on competitive bidding and long-term contracts with 
suppliers, they appear to be working effectively and efficiently. As previously mentioned, 
RPS programs appear particularly problematic in restructured electricity markets where 
retailers are uncertain of their future load obligations, and are therefore sometimes unwilling 
to enter into long-term contracts. Despite the mixed experiences, quota policies are likely to 
remain the predominant form of support for renewables in the US, at least in the near term.  
4.3.3. Renewable energy schemes in Japan 
In 2003, Japan introduced an RPS scheme requiring that approximately 1.35% of each 
retail supplier’s sales in 201044 come from eligible RES, defined as PV, wind, biomass, 
geothermal and small hydropower (1MW or less), rising to 1.63% by 2014. Electricity from 
PV is credited at two times the value from 2011 to 2014. To be certified the renewable 
electricity must be sold to the grid. The total target has been set to increase from 3.3 TWh in 
2003 to 12.2 TWh in 2010 and 16 TWh by 2014. The targets are low45 compared to those in 
the Europe and the US, partly because large hydropower and geothermal are ineligible under 
the scheme and also because a considerable amount of electricity generated from biomass is 
consumed for self use.  
As with other RPS schemes, retail suppliers and renewable generators may trade 
certificates and banking as borrowing of certificates up to 20% of the target are allowed. The 
maximum price of the certificate is set at 11 JPY/kWh (approx. 9 US cents/kWh). The total 
amount of RES supplied in 2005 was 5.6TWh46, which exceeded the actual target of 3.8TWh. 
The targets from 2006 to 2009 were revised upward by 4 TWh in total as a part of the review 
process conducted in 2006.  
                                                 
44
 All dates are fiscal year (from April to March) in Japan 
45
 Renewables currently account for roughly 10% of Japanese generation 
46
 The mix was PV 0.46TWh, wind power 1.91TWh, biomass 2.50TWh, and small hydropower 0.70TWh. 
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Since the enactment of the RPS scheme, renewable generation has steadily increased 
(Figure 4), a trend that is expected to continue (Nishio and Asano, 2006), while prices have 
declined. The certificates were traded at a relatively stable price range of around 5 JPY/kWh 
(approx. 6 US cents/kWh) from 2003 to 2005 (Figure 11), presumably because the transaction 
prices are determined with taking the banking into consideration from a long-term viewpoint.   
Promotion of PV  
Several large-scale programs to promote PV have been implemented in different parts of 
the world, the cumulative effect of which are shown in Figure 15. Three of the most 
significant are briefly described. 
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Figure 15. Cumulative installed PV capacity in selected markets 
Source: Lopez et al 2007 
 
 Japanese Residential PV Dissemination Program 
A subsidy program for promotion of PV in the residential sector in Japan was launched in 
1994. By the end of 2005 when the subsidy program was terminated47 it had resulted in over 1 
GW of new capacity and the average cost of a residential PV system had dropped by more 
than half (Figure 16). The subsidy program succeeded in creating a market, which accounted 
for less than 1% of the whole residential market, but was large enough to justify large 
investments in mass-production facilities. 
Several factors contributed to success of the program including a consistent technology-
push policy48 (Kimura and Suzuki, 2006). However it is not clear if the momentum of the 
program will continue following the termination of investment subsidies in 2005. It is not 
likely that additional promotion schemes in the residential sector will be launched by the 
government, currently focusing on R&D support for innovative PV technologies as well as 
subsidies in the non-residential sector. Moreover, the future role of the voluntary net-metering 
schemes currently offered by the power companies is not certain.  
                                                 
47
 Several local governments are continuing financial support programs. 
48
 The Japanese government has been providing larger and more stable R&D budgets for PV over the last quarter 
century than other major producing countries such as the US and Germany according to IEA’s R&D statistics. 
Also, for reference, the overall budget related to new energy technologies by METI (Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry) has tripled from 48 billion JPY in FY1996 to 156 billion JPY in FY2006. 
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Figure 16. The Japanese residential PV promotion program  
Source: Lopez et al 2007, NEF2006 
 German Rooftop PV Programs  
The first major promotional program for residential PV was the 1000 roofs program 
launched in Germany in 1989 and completed in 1994. The scheme resulted in installation of 
PV systems with an average size of 2.6 kW and a total capacity of 6.15 MW on some 2,250 
German roofs. Average system cost was US$15,000/kW with subsidies covering 70% of the 
investment costs.  
An expansion of the first scheme, called the 100,000 Roofs Program, was launched in 
1999 with the aim of reaching 100,000 installations with an average size of 3kW for a total 
installed capacity of 300 MW. Low-interest loans were provided as the main inducement, 
initially set at 0% and with a payback time of ten years. The initial response to the program 
between 1999 and 2002 was rather modest (Figure 17) and the program suffered from a 
number of stops and starts. In 2000 the interest rate was raised to 1.8% and favorable feed-in 
tariffs of 50.6 €Cent/kWh were introduced. The combination of the low interest and FIT led to 
an impressive uptake resulting in deployment of 261 MW. 
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Figure 17. The German 100,000 roofs programme 
Source: Lopez et al 2007 
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 California's PV Programs 
California is the market leader for grid-connected PV in the US driven by a mixture of 
state and local incentives as well as plentiful sunshine.  Historically, PV technology has been 
supported through capital cost rebates – denominated in $ per Watt – offered to PV system 
installers or owners to buy down the installed cost of solar installations , though more recently 
performance based incentives have also been used. Incentive programs have been supported 
by the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC), as well as the state’s publicly owned utilities.  
The CEC has administered a PV incentive program called the Emerging Renewables 
Program since 1998. As of the end of 2005, the CEC had paid out incentives to over 15,000 
PV systems, totaling 62 MW in capacity. The CPUC’s Self-Generation Incentive Program 
(SGIP) began accepting applications in 2001 and offered rebates for customer-sited PV 
systems of at least 30 kW in size49 and installed by customers taking electric or gas service 
from one of the state’s private utilities.  As of the end of 2005, the CPUC had paid out 
incentives to 403 PV systems, totaling 49 MW.   
Over time, both the CPUC and the CEC programs have altered the structure and size of 
their incentives for PV installations. The CPUC initiated its incentives at $4.5/W and dropped 
the incentive level to $3.5/W in December 2004; the CPUC further reduced the incentive to 
$2.8/W for applications received after December 2005. The CEC’s standard incentive started 
at $3/W, increased during the state’s electricity crisis to $4.5/W and then declined to $2.6/W. 
At the beginning of 2007, California’s solar programs were been restructured, including a 
move towards performance ($/kWh) based incentives. 
As shown in Figure 18 customer response to these incentives was disappointing at first, 
with relatively little PV capacity being added through 2000. Demand for PV increased 
substantially after 2000, mainly as a result of the state’s electricity crisis in 2001 and in 
response to the higher rebates offered at that time (Bolinger and Wiser 2002). Cost reductions 
under the program have been substantial, at least for smaller systems.   
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Figure 18. California's Emerging Renewables Buydown Programme (CERBP)  
Source: CEC 
 
                                                 
49
 Systems can exceed 1 MW in size, but the rebate only applies to the first 1 MW 
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Meanwhile, the state government in 2006 established the California Million Solar Roofs 
initiative, with a goal of encouraging 3,000 MW of new solar PV systems through a long-
term, sustained, declining incentive program. The CPUC – in conjunction with the CEC – has 
developed an implementation plan for this initiative, which includes performance-based 
payments for the majority of systems over 30 kW in size, replacing the current up-front 
rebates. The program is envisioned to be significant is size (~$3.2 billion) and stable (~11 
years) enough to significantly reduce system costs over time.   
Investment-based Tax Incentives 
A number of options have been used to promote renewables with fiscal instruments 
including: 
 
• Lower VAT-rate applied for renewable electricity systems; 
• Making dividends from RES-investment exempt from income taxes; and 
• Tax credits for investments in RES. 
These options have similar impact, acting as investment subsidies for new installations. 
Table 6 gives an overview of existing investment-based tax incentives in EU countries, and 
the US.  
 
Table 6. Investment-based tax incentives in various EU countries and the US as of end of 
2006 
Sources: Ragwitz et al 2007, www.dsireusa.org 
Country Investment-based tax incentives 
Austria Private investors get tax credits for investments in using renewable energies (personal income tax). The 
amount is generally limited to 2.929 € per year 
Belgium 13.5 – 14% of RES-investments deductible from company profits, regressive depreciation of investments. Reduced VAT on building retrofit if energy efficiency is included (6% instead 21%)  
Denmark The first 3000 DKK of income from wind energy are tax free. 
France Deduction of 15% investment costs with a maximum of 3000 € per person. Reduced VAT (5.5%) on 
renewable equipment (not applicable to installation costs) 
Germany Losses of investments can be deducted from the taxable income. This fact increases return on investments into 
wind projects 
Greece Up to 75% of RES-investments can be deducted  
Ireland Corporate Tax Incentive: Tax relief capped at 50% of all capital expenditure for certain RES-investments  
Italy VAT reduced to 10% for investments in wind and solar; 36% deduction of PV, solar thermal and energy 
efficiency investments up to 54.000 € (55% from 2007) 
Portugal Up to 30% of any type of investments on RES can be deducted with a maximum of 700 € per year. Reduced VAT (12%) on renewable equipment 
Spain Corporation Tax: 10% (up to 20% in some autonomous regions) tax liability instead of 35% for investments in 
environment friendly fixed assets.   
The 
Netherlands 
EIA scheme: RES-investors (most renewable energy systems) are eligible to reduce their taxable profit with 
55% of the invested sum.  
Lower interest rates from Green Funds: RES-investors (most renewable energy systems) can obtain lower 
interest rates (up to 1.5%) for their investments. Moreover dividends gained are free of income tax for private 
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investors. 
United 
States 
30% federal investment tax credit available for solar installations (capped at $2000/system for residential 
users; up-capped for commercial systems).  
Favorable 5-year accelerated tax depreciation for most “new” RES-E 
A number of states offer their own income, sales, and property tax exemptions and incentives. 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 
(M
W
)
 
Figure 19. U.S. wind power additions, by Year,  
Source: AWEA 2007, www.awea.org/faq/instcap.html 
One of the best-known tax incentives is the US federal production tax credit (PTC), which 
has been in place since 1994. The incentive is based on production, rather than investment, 
and is currently valued at 2.0 cents/kWh. Development of wind power in the US in recent 
years has been strongly tied to the PTC combined with a number of state-level quota systems.  
Even where quota systems are not in place, wind development now occurs in some states 
based on the PTC alone. Unfortunately, the PTC has expired and been re-instituted with 
regularity making it difficult for developers, investors and financiers to plan ahead, and 
resulting as a boom-and-bust cycle of wind development as shown in Figure 19.  
Mixed strategies: Wind energy in Denmark 
In terms of large-scale integration of wind power in the electricity system, Denmark is in 
a class of its own. In 2005, nearly 20% of the country’s electricity consumption was produced 
with wind power50. The western part of the Danish grid, which is not connected to the grid in 
the east, gets 24% of its electricity from wind power (www.ens.dk).  
The major reason for this impressive record is that wind power has had a prominent role 
in the Danish energy plans from 1990 and 1995. The target for wind in 2005 was an installed 
capacity of 1,500 MW or around 10% of Danish electricity demand. This target was exceeded 
by a factor of two by 2003, where the installed wind capacity passed the 3,000 MW mark 
(Meyer, 2005).  
Additionally, Denmark has enjoyed a stable legal framework and a favorable FIT scheme 
supported by successive governments. This created a stable investment climate in the 1990s 
                                                 
50
 Adjusted to an average wind year. 
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and ensured that the overall energy policy did not change dramatically until a shift occurred in 
2001 with the arrival of a liberal-conservative government. Another contributing factor was 
the introduction of a comprehensive wind atlas showing the local potential for wind energy in 
different parts of the country (Petersen et al 1981).  
Prior to 1990s, the majority of renewable generators were cooperatives who enjoyed tax 
exemptions for their shareholders, guaranteed minimum price system and preferential 
treatment for the neighborhood. Starting in early 1990s Danish municipalities were forced to 
indicate sites suited for wind power generation. At that time many farmers saw an advantage 
in owning their own turbines as a financial investment that could be written off on the 
business account of the farm. This possibility was not available for the cooperatives. As a 
result many of the new turbines in the late 1990s were owned by farmers and developers.  
Since 2001, anyone, including investors from abroad, may own wind turbines in Denmark. At 
the end of 2006 nearly 5,500 wind turbines were operating in the country. 
In 2004, a political agreement was reached by the Danish Parliament to increase wind 
power capacity over the coming years by some 350 MW through a repowering scheme. 
Furthermore, the agreement included two tenders for offshore wind farms of 200 MW each, 
together with a decision to introduce full legal and ownership unbundling by separating 
transmission and production of electricity. This is expected to increase wind power’s share of 
Danish power generation to 25% by 2008. Beyond 2008 it is expected that most of the 
development will have to be offshore and by the replacement of older onshore turbines. 
The Danish Wind Associations has proposed a goal of 50% wind power by 2025 in the 
Danish energy mix with the installation of 200 MW per year. A recently published analysis 
from the association51 shows that wind power’s share of Danish electricity consumption could 
be increased from the 20% or 6.6 TWh in 2004 to 50%  or19 TWh while reducing the number 
of wind turbines by more than two thirds, from the current  5,500 to 1,750. The turbine types 
onshore are assumed to be 1 MW, 1.5 MW and 3 MW machines, all commercially available 
today, while the offshore turbines are assumed to be 4 MW and 6 MW turbines. 
                                                 
51
  As recently published in (Danish Wind Turbine Owners Association, 2005). 
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5. What works and why?  
Reviewing the variety of schemes and instruments described above one is tempted to ask 
whether these programs have been successful and if so by what measure? The two most 
important criteria are effectiveness and economic efficiency. Additional criteria include 
credibility of the scheme for investors and the reduction of generation costs over time. Table 8 
provides a summary of the relevant performance parameters, which are further described 
below. 
Table 8. Summary of performance parameters 
  
Period of 
time 
analysed  
RES 
quantity 
deployed 
(W/cap yr) 
Magnitude of 
absolute 
support level  
decrease in 
support over 
time? 
Risk for 
investors Other important aspects 
FIT&premium:           
US (PURPA) 1978-1990 Medium   high  No  low   
Denmark  1992-1999 high low No low  
Germany  1998-2005 high   medium Yes low   
Spain 2002-2005 high 
low (fixed 
option); 
medium 
(premium) 
Yes low   
Austria 2002-2005 high Medium No low 
Support level to high 
because of parallel 
investment subsidies  
Portugal 2002-2005 high Low No low   
France 2002-2005 low Medium No low High administrative barriers  
RPS and quota-based TGC:         
UK (RO) 2003-2005 low (quota 
not met) High Yes 
Medium/hi
gh Penalty too low 
Italy 2003-2005 Low  High No high 
Time of validity of RES 
plants for certificates too 
low (8 years) 
Sweden 2003-2005 high (quota 
met) Low Constant medium 
Windfall profits due to 
some old capacities also 
qualifiying for certificates  
Belgium 2003-2005 low (quota 
not met) High No 
Medium/hi
gh 
low penalty, Windfall 
profits due to some old 
capacities also 
qualifiying for certificates  
Texas 2003-2005 High (quota met) Low No 
Low/Medi
um 
Low with long term 
contracts available 
Massachusetts 2003-2005 
Medium 
(quota not 
met) 
High No High 
Few longer-term 
contracts available 
TGCs 
Japan 2003-2005 Low (quota 
met )  Medium  No  Low   
Tendering: 
  
          
UK (NFFO) 1990-1998 low Low Yes Low after 
selection Capacities to low 
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Effectiveness of policy instruments 
To examine the effectiveness, one must look at the relevant outcome, in this case the 
quantities generated or capacities installed and so on. To make relevant comparison among 
different countries, the figures must be examined by capita. Moreover, one must examine all 
new RES as well as specific types such as wind and PV.   
Figure 21 shows policy effectiveness of different policies for electricity generation from 
all new RES for the period 1998-2004 for EU, US and Japan measured in terms of 
incremental amount of RES installed per year and capita. Not surprisingly, Denmark ranks the 
highest on this score with about twice as high renewable electricity deployed than the next 
ranked countries Finland, Sweden, Spain and Germany. It should be noticed, however, that 
since 2003 the net increase in wind power capacity has been close to zero in Denmark.  
Many of the variations in Figure 20 can be attributed to different promotion schemes such 
as the quota-based TGC system in Sweden as opposed to investment incentives in Finland and 
FITs in the other countries. Other factors also play a role such as the availability of 
inexpensive hydro electricity in Nordic countries and plentiful supplies of cheap electricity 
from biomass. Moreover, progress was generally much slower in new EU member states than 
in the old EU-15 countries. Of the former, Hungary and Latvia showed the highest relative 
growth in the period considered. The US and Japan deployed clearly less new RES electricity 
per capita than the EU-25.  
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Figure 20. Policy effectiveness of support measures for electricity from new RES (excl. 
hydro) measured in additional kWh per year and per capita for the period 1998-2004 in the 
EU, the US and Japan 
Sources: EUROSTAT 2006, IEA 2006b, METI 2007, Black & Veatch 2006 
 
Looking at onshore wind (Figure 21) the EU countries with the highest policy 
effectiveness during the considered period – Demark, Germany, and Spain – are the ones that  
applied fixed FITs during the entire period 1998-2005, except for Denmark which had a 
change in 2001. The resulting high investment security as well as low administrative barriers 
stimulated a strong and continuous growth in wind energy during the last decade. By contrast, 
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high administrative barriers in countries like France can significantly hamper the development 
of wind energy even under a stable policy environment combined with reasonably high FITs.  
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Figure 21. Policy effectiveness of onshore wind onshore measured in additional capacity per 
year and per capita in the period 1998-2005 in the EU, the US and Japan   
Sources: EUROSTAT 2006, IEA 2006b, METI 2007, Black & Veatch 2006 
With respect to PV – currently one of the most expensive among renewable technologies 
– Germany and Japan show the highest effectiveness based on this particular measure (Figure 
22). Obviously, generous FITs – as in Germany and Luxembourg, combined with net 
metering and rebates in Japan, produce results.   
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Figure 22. Policy effectiveness of PV electricity support measured in additional capacity per 
year and per capita in the period 1998-2005 in the EU, the US and Japan  
Sources: EUROSTAT 2006, IEA 2006b, METI 2007, Black & Veatch 2006 
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Economic efficiency 
In examining economic efficiency three parameters are of interest: absolute support 
levels, total costs to society and dynamics of the technology. As an indicator in the following 
the support levels are specifically compared for wind power in the EU-1552.  
Figure 23 shows that for many countries the support level and the generation costs are 
very close. Countries with rather high average generation costs frequently show a higher 
support level. A deviation from this trend can be found in the three quota systems in Belgium, 
Italy and the UK, for which the support is presently significantly higher than the generation 
costs. The reasons for the higher support level expressed by the current green certificate prices 
may differ. Main reasons are risk premiums, immature TGC markets, and short validity times 
for the certificates, which apply to Italy and Belgium.  
For Finland, the level of support for onshore wind is too low to initiate any steady growth 
in capacity. In the case of Spain and Germany, the support level indicated in Figure 23 
appears to be above the average level of generation costs. However, the potentials with rather 
low average generation costs have already been exploited in these countries due to the recent 
successful market growth. Therefore a level of support that is moderately higher than average 
costs seems to be reasonable even if it results in windfall profits for some wind power 
owners.53 In an assessment over time also the potential technology learning effects should be 
taken into account in the support scheme. 
 
 
                                                 
52
  A comparison of all new RES would provide too broad ranges for generation costs as well as for support 
measures. 
53
 Under TGC all the technologies receive the marginal cost, i.e. there is a higher profit for some low cost 
technologies (wind power, biogas in Italy). Under high quantitative targets this can result in higher costs for the 
electricity consumers. 
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Figure 23. Support levels for onshore wind (average to maximum) in the EU, US, and Japan 
in 200554 (Source: Adapted from Ragwitz et al 2007). 
Quantities vs costs of support 
Next the relation between quantities deployed and the level of support is analysed. It is 
often argued that the reason for higher capacities installed is a higher support level. And it is 
accepted that the resource endowments of RES vary from country to country. Paradoxically, 
countries with highest support levels – Belgium and Italy for example – are among those with 
the lowest specific deployment (Figure 24). On the other hand, high FITs especially in 
Germany and Spain are often named as the main driver for investments especially in wind 
energy. However, the support level in these countries is not particularly high compared with 
other countries analysed here.  
                                                 
54
 Minimum to average generation costs are shown because this range typically contains presently realisable 
potentials which investors would normally deploy in order to generate electricity at minimum costs. 
Furthermore, the maximum generation costs can be very high in each country so that showing the upper cost 
range for the different RES-E would affect the readability of the graphs 
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Figure 24. Effectiveness vs costs of promotion programmes for electricity from RES in 
selected countries (2002-2004)  
Source: own investigations 
What triggers investments? 
Analyzing the various promotional strategies from the point-of-view of investors may 
allow a better understanding of program costs and help in the design of more efficient 
schemes (Langniss, Wiser, 2003; Finon, Perez, 2007).  
FIT schemes and tendering instruments may work well in combination to promote both 
mature and less mature technologies. In fact there are similarities of producer-buyer 
arrangements with respect to these systems. The risks to purchasers and generators is largely 
alleviated in cases of FITs and tendering. This is due to long-term contracts ensured by 
governments. One should note, however, that in the tendering system, transaction costs are 
much higher for the developer than in the FIT system, due to the cost of preparation for the 
bid in the tendering process.  
In the quota-based TGC systems, multiple risks for the investors may emerge resulting in 
strong preference for long-term arrangements. The strong bilateral interdependence between 
developers and obligated purchasers may lead to long-term contracts and to vertical 
integration. Recourse to spot transactions of green certificates has turned out to be only 
marginal in determining the certificate price. For small and medium sized suppliers with 
uncertain demand, there remains a tension between the risk associated with the uncertainty of  
future loads and the certificate obligation as well as the efficiency of managing the risks by 
long term contracting - as shown in the RPS programs which are set in some of the most 
liberalized US electricity markets.  
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However, some authors (e.g., Lemmings, 2003) argue that with regard to financial risks, 
the TGC/quota systems may give incentives to renewable electricity developers to avoid 
contracts with forward fixed price because the spot market will give higher prospects for 
profit. 
Four elements play against this view. Firstly, volatility and price risk are high because the 
size of the certificates market is small. Secondly, in the case where RES producers sell green 
electricity as two products (electricity sale on one hand and green certificates on the other), 
the risk to the green certificate price is added to the risk of the wholesale electricity price. 
Certificates banking which is supposed to help the obligated suppliers to respect their quotas 
can increase the lack of liquidity in a period of tight supply of certificates. Thirdly, 
transactional complexity which results from intermittence of RES generation also influences 
the choice of long-term contract. The absence of a purchase obligation on physical electricity 
(it is only a quota of certificates) reinforces the producer’s incentive to conclude long term 
contracts in order to simplify transactions55. Fourthly, the price of certificates is affected by a 
number of risks, in particular the regulatory risk arising from an eventual alteration in the 
renewables portfolio of eligible technologies (adding a cheap technology – e.g. co-firing or 
burning waste – may lower the prices because it increases the quantity of available 
certificates). In addition comes the risk of large actors exercising market power. So the RES 
producers have good reasons for negotiating contracts with buyers who are subject to quotas.  
Furthermore, it is important to underline than most of the quantity-based instruments 
(European TGCs, American RPS programs) win in effectiveness when they benefit from 
reinforcement by subsidy on investment or on production  In the UK, technology-specific 
investment grants selected by tendering for projects based on second-ranked technologies 
complement TGC systems in order to mitigate their drawback in fostering variety in 
technological deployment. In the US the quite recent combination of the renewed  federal 
support by tax credit on production and RPS programs have had important revival effect as 
shown by the recent wind power capacity growth  (see Fig. 19).   
The above reflections indicate that a long-term and stable policy environment for 
potential investors - with favourable economic support schemes – may be the key criteria for 
the success of developing renewables markets.  
Cost evolution of technologies  
The cost reduction of the renewable technologies is another important criteria for 
evaluating the efficiency of policy instruments in relation to technological learning. In the 
following the development of costs for onshore wind and PV are examine.   
The development of investment costs for wind turbines from the early 1980s until 2005 in 
Europe and the US is shown in Figure 25. In both regions, costs have dropped significantly. In 
Europe, costs decreased from around 2,500 EUR/kW in 1982 to 1,500 EUR/kW in 1990 and 
further to below 1,000 € in 2000. Since then costs have stagnated due to shortage of turbines 
in a fast growing market.  
 
                                                 
55
 Long-term contracts also define the party which pays the balancing costs: generally the obligated suppliers 
assume them. 
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Figure 25 Development of the investment costs of wind turbines in Europe (data based on 
Denmark and Germany.  
Source: Nej at all 2003, Morthorst 2006, Wiser and Bolinger 2007. Data are in real 2006 
prices.  
A similar trend can be observed in the US where installed wind projects costs are shown 
extending back to 1982, including both proposed and online projects. A significant drop in 
investment costs56 up until about 1996 can be seen, and followed by stagnation and, more 
recently a rise. Similar trends can be observed for PV system costs, where high global demand 
have resulted in high profits for developers. 
The cost development for electricity generation from (small) PV systems in different 
countries is shown in Figure 26 where the decreasing cost trend has been replaced by 
stagnation and even a slight increase in costs during recent years. This is mainly due to 
shortage of basic silicon material for the production of traditional PVs in a fast growing 
market. Also, the recent stagnation of cost reduction implies that a further technology 
innovation is required for PVs in order that they become economically competitive with 
conventional power plants57.  
 
                                                 
56
 The data included in this graphic include information on 265 wind projects totaling 17,420 MW.  
57
 For a more detailed analysis of the development of the costs of different components see Lopez/Haas (2006).   
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Figure 26. Cost reductions of PV systems over time (Source: Lopez/Haas et al 2007, Data are 
in real 2000 prices)  
With respect to the price development in California Wiser et al. (2006) argue that the lack 
of a sustained long-term policy commitment may be reducing the incentive for cost 
reductions. Moreover, PV prices have been fluctuating along side rebate levels; PV prices 
increasing with rises in rebate levels - and falling with rebates drops.  This means that subsidy 
variations, if not designed with care, may be used by retailers to increase their own profits to 
the disadvantage of consumers in a sellers market. Perfect competition only exists in theory, 
and this should be taken into account when designing support schemes. 
  
6. Conclusions  
Clearly, a wide range of policy instruments have been tried and are in place in different 
parts of the world to promote renewable energy technologies. The design and performance of 
these schemes varies from place to place, requiring further research to determine their 
effectiveness in delivering the desired results. The main  conclusions that can be drawn from 
the present analysis are: 
• Generally speaking, promotional schemes that are properly designed within a stable 
framework and offer long-term investment continuity produce better results. Credibility 
and continuity reduce risks thus leading to lower profit requirements by investors.  
• Despite their significant growth in absolute terms in a number of key markets, the near-
term prognosis for renewables is one of modest success if measured in terms of the 
percentage of the total energy provided by renewables on a world-wide basis. This is a 
significant challenge, suggesting that renewables have to grow at an even faster pace if 
we expect them to contribute on a significant scale to the world’s energy mix. 
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